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“In  1956,  Brazilian  troops  were  sent  to  the  first  United  Nations  Emergency  Force  in  Suez  
(UNEF).   Since   then,   Brazil   has   participated   in   33   United   Nations   peacekeeping  
operations   and   contributed  with   over   27,000   troops.”   (Viotti,   2011)  This   statement,   by  
former  Brazilian  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  Maria  Luiza  R.  Viotti,  
is   fairly   typical   example   of   how  Brazil   sees   itself   in   the  UN  context.   For   the  past   two  
decades,  Brazil’s   role  as  a   traditional  contributor  of   troops   to  peacekeeping  operations  
has   been   a   recurrent   element   in   the   country’s   diplomatic   discourse.   It   has   often   been  
cited  as  a  factor  underpinning  the  country’s  ambitions  to  become  a  permanent  member  
of   the   Security  Council   and   as   an   asset   in   its  most   recent   campaign   to   occupy   a  non-­‐‑
permanent  seat  on  that  body  (MRE,  2009;  Amorim,  1995;  Seixas  Corrêa,  2012;  Cardoso,  
1998).    
   Yet   from  1967   to   1989  Brazil  did  not   take  part   in   any  peacekeeping  operations.  
Although  there  were  relatively  few  operations  in  that  period2,  Brazil’s  complete  lack  of  
contribution   is   still   somewhat  odd,  given   that   it   contributed   to  peacekeeping  missions  
between  1956  and  1967.  Even  more  puzzling  is  that  Brazil’s  absence  from  peacekeeping  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The opinions of the authors are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of External 
Relations. 
 
2 In contrast with the dozens of peacekeeping operations created since 1989, only five were established from 1967 to 
1988; three others had been created before 1967 and remained in existence after that year – to this day, in fact. See 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf, accessed on 1/4/2015. 
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coincided  with  a  particularly  active  period   in   its  UN  diplomacy,  when   it   took  a  vocal  
role   on   a   number   of   international   security   issues.   Why,   then,   the   curious   lack   of  
participation  in  peacekeeping  missions?  
At   first  glance,  one  might  be   tempted   to  blame  Brazil’s  withdrawal  on   the  1964  
coup   d’état   that   established   Brazil’s   military   dictatorship,   or   on   the   deepening   of  
political   repression   after   1968.   Upon   further   study,   however,   this   explanation   is  
unconvincing.  There   is  no  empirical  evidence   to  suggest   that  authoritarian  regimes  do  
not  or  cannot  contribute  to  peacekeeping  missions3,  and  in  Brazil’s  case,  even  after  the  
coup,   the   contribution   to   UNEF   I   continued   until   that   mission’s   dissolution   in   1967.  
Even  the  cautious  process  of  political  liberalization  begun  in  the  late  1970s  did  not  lead  
to  Brazil’s  return  to  peacekeeping:  on  the  contrary,  in  1977,  Brazil  distanced  itself  even  
further  from  the  debates  on  the  issue.  The  explanation  for  the  Brazilian  absence  should  
thus   be   sought   in   a   more   complex   understanding   of   the   country’s   perception   of  
international  reality  and  of  its  role  in  it.  
   This  article  examines  the  worldview  that  discouraged  Brazil  from  participating  in  
UN  peacekeeping  operations  from  1967  to  1989.  It   is  divided  in  five  sections,  followed  
by  a  brief  conclusion:  the  first  analyses  Brazil’s  pre-­‐‑1967  contributions  to  peacekeeping;  
the  second  contextualizes  the  roots  of  Brazilian  multilateral  activism  from  the  late  1960s  
to  the  early  1980s;  the  third  explores  the  limits  of  that  activism  and  why  peacekeeping  
fell  outside  of  those  limits;  the  fourth  considers  other  factors  that  may  have  influenced  
policymakers’  attitudes  towards  peacekeeping;  and  the  fifth  briefly  examines  how  Brazil  
reentered  the  world  of  UN  peacekeeping  in  the  late  1980s.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The studies by Andersson do not exclude participation by authoritarian regimes, they underline the willingness of 
democracies to contribute (Andersson, 2000; Andersson, 2002). 
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From  San  Francisco  to  Rafah  –  Brazil'ʹs  initial  experience  with  peacekeeping:  
  
Brazil  was  an  active  belligerent  in  the  Second  World  War  and  a  founding  member  of  the  
United  Nations.  Like  most  Latin  American  countries,  it  had  a  cautious  attitude  towards  
the  new  system  of  collective  security,  fearing  that  it  would  spell  the  end  of  Washington’s  
commitment   to   the   Americas.   Nevertheless,   Brazil   participated   energetically   in   the  
young  Organization,   including   by   serving   a   number   of   elected   terms   on   the   Security  
Council   (1946-­‐‑1947,  1951-­‐‑1952  and  1954-­‐‑1955).  While   in   the  General  Assembly  and   the  
Economic   and   Social   Council,   Brazil   sought   to   obtain   concrete   gains   in   areas   such   as  
technical  and  development  cooperation,  in  the  Security  Council,  Brazil’s  approach  was  
closer   to   “prestige   multilateralism”,   without   immediate   material   reward   (Campbell,  
1973:   111-­‐‑129;   Uziel,   2010:   131-­‐‑161;   Bueno,   1994:   61-­‐‑72).   There,   Brazilian   diplomats  
largely  supported  the  positions  of  the  United  States,  particularly  regarding  issues  where  
there  was  a  clear  cleavage  between  Washington  and  Moscow,  but  managed  to  preserve  
some  degree  of  independence.  
   From   1946   to   1967,   Brazil   took  part   in   eight   different   peacekeeping   operations:  
UNSCOB4,   in   Greece;   DOMREP5,   in   the   Dominican   Republic;   UNFICYP,   in   Cyprus;  
UNYOM,  in  Yemen;  ONUC,  in  the  Congo;  UNSF,  in  Irian  Java;  UNIPOM,  in  India  and  
Pakistan;  and  UNEF  I,  in  Suez.  Of  those,  the  contribution  to  UNEF  I  was  by  far  the  most  
significant,  both  in  terms  of  troops  committed  (a  full  battalion  of  600  per  year)  and  of  the  
internal  political  debate  that  followed  on  the  pros  and  cons  of  sending  Brazilian  soldiers  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although UNSCOB is not officially considered a peacekeeping mission, its characteristics are very similar to those 
of the late 1940s observer missions. 
 
5 The United Nations mission DOMREP should not be confused with the so-called “inter-American force” that 
preceded it and effectively occupied the country. Brazil’s participation in that force was significant and 
controversial; its contribution to DOMREP was minor and passed largely unnoticed. 
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to  United  Nations  peacekeeping  missions  (Fontoura,  2009).  Grasping  why  Brazil  chose  
to   begin   contributing   to   peacekeeping   in   1956   is   key   to   understanding   its   decision   to  
stop  after  1967.  
   The  decision  to  contribute  to  UNEF  I  resulted  from  a  confluence  of  three  factors.  
In  the  years  since  1947,  Brazil  had  been  involved  in  the  multilateral  debates  and  actions  
on   the   Middle   East.   These   included   the   role   of   Oswaldo   Aranha,   who   presided   the  
General  Assembly  session  that  approved  the  partition  of  Palestine,  and  the  involvement  
in   negotiation   of   Security   Council   decisions   that   attempted   to   mitigate   the   conflict  
between   Israel   and   its   Arab   neighbors.   Those   recent   events   fostered   in   Brazilian  
diplomacy   a   sense   of   responsibility   for   the   developments   in   the   Middle   East,   which  
certainly  helped   lead   the  country   to  send   its   troops   to  a   region   that,   in   the  1950s,  was  
still  considered  very  far  away  (Santos,  2000:  34-­‐‑38).  
   A  second   factor   that   encouraged  Brazil   to   take  part   in  UNEF   I  was   its   constant  
advocacy  for  a  greater  role   for  middle  and  small  powers   in   the  United  Nations.  Brazil  
had  been  pushing  this  issue  since  the  San  Francisco  Conference  and  continued  to  do  so  
in   the   debates   on   the   Suez   crisis   and   the   establishment   of   the   peacekeeping  mission.  
When  requesting  the  Brazilian  Congress  to  authorize  the  deployment  of  troops  to  UNEF  
I,   the  Ministry  of  External  Relations   emphasized   that   the  mission’s   establishment  was  
directly   linked   to   the  Uniting   for  Peace  resolution   (resolution  377  A  (V)),  which  Brazil  
had  actively  helped  to  negotiate,  seeking  not  only  to  support  the  position  of  the  United  
States,   but   principally   to   strengthen   the   role   of   the   General   Assembly   (Brasil,   1956a:  
11187-­‐‑11188)6.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Brazil, alongside Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, was chosen to be a member of the UNEF 
advisory committee, established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I), of 11/7/1956 
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html, accessed on 1/8/2015). 
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   The  third  factor  referred  to  broader  changes  in  Brazilian  foreign  policy,  stemming  
from   the  evolution  of  policymakers’  worldview.  President   Juscelino  Kubitschek   (1956-­‐‑
1961)  had  a  vision  of   rapid  progress   for  Brazil  which,   in   the  external  arena,   translated  
into   a  more   activist   approach   to   affirming   the   country’s   relevance   and   interests.   This  
activism  was  coupled  with  an  effort  to  work  more  closely  with  the  United  States  both  in  
the  Americas  and  around  the  world  –  a  purpose  for  which  UNEF  I  was  particularly  well  
suited  (Weis,  1993:  113-­‐‑140).  The  same  request  to  Congress  mentioned  above  underlined  
that  the  dynamism  of   international  politics,  as  demonstrated  by  the  emergence  of  new  
nations   and   conflicts,   required   Brazil   to   take   a   more   prominent   role   in   international  
affairs   and   take   concrete   actions   to   put   into   practice   its   traditional   defense   of   the  
principles  of   international   liberty  and   justice.   In   the  words  of   the  Minister  of  External  
Relations,   the  Brazilian   contingent   “(…)  would  demonstrate   that  we   can   and  we  will,  
when  time  comes,  come  to  the  forefront  of  the  international  system,  a  natural  position  to  
which  we  cannot  renounce”  (Brasil,  1956a:  11188;  Lannes,  2009:  64-­‐‑83;  Bueno  &  Cervo,  
2001:  287-­‐‑307).  
   Congress  approved  the  request  to  send  troops  to  Suez,  but  not  before  opposition  
politicians   raised   a   series   of   objections,  which  would   resurface   in   the   future.  The   first  
was   the   concern   that   instead   of   keeping   the   peace,   Brazilian   troops   might   end   up  
involved  in  a  larger  conflict,  into  which  Brazil  might  be  drawn  against  its  will.  Secondly,  
there  was   a   fear   that   peacekeeping  might   be  manipulated   to   serve   the   great   powers’  
interests,  to  the  detriment  of  Brazil’s  own  interests  and  principles.  Critics  pointed  to  the  
lack   of   international   action   with   regards   to   the   Hungarian   crisis,   suggesting   that  
neglecting  Hungary  while  rushing  to  Suez  would  be  an  endorsement  of  unjust  double  
standards.  Finally,  it  was  charged  that  Brazil,  as  a  developing  country,  could  not  afford  
to  squander  its  resources  in  foreign  adventures  and  should  direct  its  attentions  inwardly  
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(Brasil,   1956a:   11187-­‐‑11195;   Brasil,   1956b:   11237-­‐‑11248   and   11283-­‐‑11284;   Brasil,   1956c:  
11467-­‐‑11472;  Brasil,  1956d:  11514-­‐‑11526)  
   The  Brazilian   troops  remained   in   the  Middle  East   from  early  1957   to   June  1967,  
when   the  Six  Days  War  resulted   in  UNEF   I  being  disbanded.  For   two  years,  Brazilian  
generals   commanded   the   Force.   The   mission’s   withdrawal,   however,   was   a   chaotic  
affair,   that   left   bad   memories   among   the   soldiers   and   officers   involved.   There   were  
difficulties   in   evacuating   the   battalion,   which   was   caught   in   the   crossfire.   It   only  
managed  to  leave  the  Middle  East  and  return  to  Brazil  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  
having  suffered  casualties  (Fontoura,  2005:  214-­‐‑216;  Santos,  2002;  United  Nations,  2014;  
Arraes  Filho,  2008).  Following  the  dissolution  of  UNEF  I,  Brazil  would  not  return  to  UN  
peacekeeping  until  1989.  
  
The  Roots  of  Brazil’s  Multilateral  Activism:  
  
Taken   by   itself,   Brazil’s   absence   from   peacekeeping   between   1967   and   1989   is   not  
particularly  noteworthy.  Many  other  countries  also  refrained  from  participating  in  these  
missions.   What   is   striking   about   the   Brazilian   case   is   that   the   withdrawal   from  
peacekeeping   occurred   simultaneously  with   a   notable   uptick   in   Brasília’s  multilateral  
activism,   including   in   the   sphere   of   international   security.   This   activism   reflected  
changing   views   of   the   kinds   of   international   support   required   to   spur   the   country’s  
development.   From   the  mid-­‐‑1930s,   Brazil   had   focused   on   extracting   bilateral   aid   and  
technical  assistance  from  the  United  States.  This  approach  proved  particularly  effective  
before  and  during  World  War   II,  when  Brazil’s  strategic  value  rendered  the  American  
government  particularly  generous  (Moura,  1980).  
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   After   the  war,   however,  Washington’s   increased   focus   on   the   Cold  War   being  
waged   in   Europe   and  Asia   resulted   in   dwindling   support   for   Brazilian   development.  
Beginning  with   the  Kubitschek  government   (1956-­‐‑1961),  policymakers   sought   to  place  
their  requests  for  aid  in  a  more  contemporary  political  context,  through  efforts  such  as  
the  “Operation  Pan-­‐‑America”,  which  attempted  to  portray  American  financing  for  Latin  
American  development  as  a  form  of  combating  communism  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  
(Mello  e  Silva,  1992).  
   In   the   Quadros   (1961)   and   Goulart   (1961-­‐‑1964)   administrations,   the   so-­‐‑called  
“Independent   Foreign   Policy”   took   this   link   between   economic   development   and  
international  politics  even  further.  Brazilian  diplomacy  took  heed  of  the  economic  work  
of   Raul   Prebisch   and   of   the   increasingly   robust   denunciation   of   the   injustice   of   the  
international   system   by   the   newly-­‐‑decolonized   countries   of   Africa   and   Asia.   In   New  
York  and  Geneva,  Brazil’s  representatives  took  on  a  leading  role  in  calling  for  stronger  
multilateral   institutions,   that   could  provide   a  more   robust   and   supportive   framework  
for  the  development  of  Third  World  countries  (Brito  Cruz,  1989;  Ligiéro,  2011).  
   In   1964,   the  military   coup   d’état   led   to  what   has   been   called   an   “out   of   step”  
moment   in   Brazilian   foreign   policy   (Bueno   &   Cervo,   2001:   368-­‐‑373).   Under   Castello  
Branco  (1964-­‐‑1967),  the  new  regime  sought  to  burnish  its  pro-­‐‑Washington  credentials  by  
putting  aside  concerns  with  international  inequality  and  adopting  a  rhetoric  focused  on  
East-­‐‑West  issues  and  the  dangers  of  “communist  subversion”.  
   In  1967,  however,  with  the  inauguration  of  General  Artur  da  Costa  e  Silva,  Brazil  
returned   to   a   more   nationalistic   discourse.   Costa   e   Silva,   like   his   successors   in   the  
military   regime,   represented   a   section   of   the   Army   whose   instinctive   and   profound  
anticommunism  was  matched   by   an   almost   obsessive   concern  with   Brazil’s   economic  
development.  They  did  not  shirk  from  criticizing  what  they  considered  unfair  efforts  by  
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the   developed   countries   to   hamper   the   progress   of   developing   countries   –   while,  
practically  in  the  same  breath,  reaffirming  their  allegiance  to  the  cause  of  the  West  in  the  
Cold  War  (Vizentini,  2004:  77-­‐‑81;  Altemani  de  Oliveira,  2005:  124-­‐‑131).  
   The   technocratic   nature   of   Brazil’s   military   regime   meant   that   the   Ministry   of  
External   Relations   had   considerable   leverage   over   foreign   policy.   Therefore,   to  
understand   the  multilateral   activism  demonstrated  by  Brazil   from  1967   onwards,   it   is  
helpful  to  analyze  the  worldview  that  predominated  among  key  Brazilian  policymakers  
(Hurrell,  2013;  Lima,  1992;  Pinheiro,  2000).  This  worldview  was  comprised  of  four  main  
elements.   The   first  was   a   concern  with   Brazil’s   development:   economic   progress  was  
seen  as  the  ultimate  objective  of  foreign  policy.  A  second  element  was  a  belief  in  Brazil’s  
“destiny”  –  a  conviction  that  the  country’s  size,  resources  and  population  allowed  it  an  
important  role  not  only  in  regional,  but  also  global  politics.  
   The   third   element   was   the   conviction   that   economic   ends   would   have   to   be  
achieved   by   political   means,   forged   at   the   United   Nations   Conference   on   Trade   and  
Development   (UNCTAD,   1964)   and   epitomized   in   the   G-­‐‑77.7   Accepting   the   postulate  
that  underdevelopment  resulted  at  least  in  part  from  international  structures,  Brazilian  
diplomats   believed   that   political   pressure   was   required   on   an   international   level   to  
change  those  structures  and  open  the  door  to  development.  
   Finally,   the   worldview   of   the   Brazilian   Ministry   of   External   Relations   was  
strongly   influenced   by  what  Ambassador   João  Augusto   de  Araujo   Castro   called   “the  
freezing   of   world   power”.8   This   referred   to   the   process   by   which   the   great   powers  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Group of 77, or G-77, is a coalition of developing countries established by the “Joint Declaration of the 
Seventy-Seven Developing Countries”, issued at the end of the first session of UNCTAD. Concerning itself 
essentially with development, trade, and economic issues, the Group became an active vehicle for Brazil and other 
developing countries at the United Nations. 
 
8 João Augusto Araujo Castro (1919-1975) was perhaps the most influential Brazilian diplomat of the Cold War 
period. Having occupied a number of important positions such as Minister of External Relations (1963-1964), 
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sought,  through  tacit  or  explicit  understandings,  to  preserve  their  privileged  place  in  the  
international   system,   for   instance,  by  enshrining   the  veto  power   in   the  UN  Charter  or  
the   monopoly   on   nuclear   weapons   in   the   Nuclear   Non-­‐‑Proliferation   Treaty   (NPT).  
Although  later  decried  by  some  critics  as  “an  invitation  to  a  conspiratorial  interpretation  
of   history”,   the   “freezing   of  world   power”   proved   itself   a   potent   conceptual   lens   for  
Brazilian   diplomacy,   which   led   policymakers   to   focus   on   how   and   where   the   great  
powers  sought  to  establish  the  rules  of  the  international  system  (Campos,  2004:  865).  
   Taken   together,   these   factors   led   Brazil   to   adopt   an   assertive,   activist   role   in  
multilateral   fora   –   including   in   debates   and   discussions   about   international   security.  
Brazil   was   an   active   participant   in   the   Eighteen   Nation   Committee   on   Disarmament  
(ENCD),   where,   in   a   context   of   mutual   suspicion   and   disagreement   between   the  
superpowers,  it  sought  to  help  achieve  an  agreement  along  the  lines  of  what  ended  up  
becoming   the   Partial   Test-­‐‑Ban   Treaty.   Brazil   used   its   1967-­‐‑1968   term   on   the   Security  
Council  as  a  platform  to  question  the  manner  in  which  the  superpowers  sought  to  deal  
with  international  conflicts  –  particularly  in  the  Middle  East  and  in  Czechoslovakia.  In  
the   UN   General   Assembly,   Brazilian   diplomats   not   only   helped   to   lead   the   charge  
against   what   they   denounced   as   the   “undisguisable   institutionalization   of   inequality  
between   States”   enshrined   the   Non-­‐‑Proliferation   Treaty   (Vizentini,   2004:   114-­‐‑116;  
Amado,  1982:  100),  but  also  expended  considerable  time  and  effort  in  trying  to  promote  
a  broader   re-­‐‑think  of   the  UN’s   role   in   international   security   (Cançado  Trindade,   1981:  
181-­‐‑182;  Amado,  1982:  109-­‐‑117).  
  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (1968-1971), and Ambassador to the United States 
(1971-1975), he is most well known for his intellectual influence over his peers and his contribution to Brazil’s view 
of the international system during the 1960s and 1970s (Vargas 2013). 
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The  Limits  of  Brazil’s  Multilateral  Activism  –  the  case  of  peacekeeping:  
     
For  Brazil,   therefore,   security   issues  were  a  means   to  an  end,   rather   than   the   result  of  
direct   concerns   with   military   threats   or   resolution   of   particular   conflicts.   In   some  
instances,   Brazil’s   engagement   reflected   a   concern   on   the   underlying   implications   for  
development.  This  was  at  least  partly  the  case  with  the  NPT,  which  policymakers  feared  
would   hinder   the   country’s   access   to   peaceful   nuclear   technology   that   might   help  
accelerate  economic  progress.9  
   In  other  cases,  Brazil’s  concern  with  security  issues  was  spurred  by  the  fear  that  
the   rhetoric   of   promoting   peace   was   being   used   by   the   great   powers   to   erode   other  
states’  autonomy  and  sovereignty  in  ways  that  could  harm  Brazil  in  the  future.  A  clear  
example   of   this   was   Brazil’s   strident   condemnation   of   the   USSR’s   enunciation   of   the  
Brezhnev   Doctrine   and   the   United   States’   tacit   acceptance   of   it,   after   the   invasion   of  
Czechoslovakia.10  
   In   this   context,   the   peacekeeping   gap   in   Brazil’s  multilateral   activism   becomes  
easier  to  understand.  Peacekeeping  operations  did  not  appear  to  directly  affect  Brazil’s  
developmental  prospects   or   even   its   economic   interests  more  broadly   –  Brazil   had  no  
major   commercial   interests   in   the   countries  where   the   operations  were   deployed,   for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Brazilian officials were frequently vague and imprecise regarding the precise contribution that nuclear power would 
make to national development. For instance, President Costa e Silva, during a meeting of Brazil’s National Security 
Council, averred that “peaceful nuclear explosions” might have relevant trade implications. These flights of fancy 
were not restricted to Brazil: a 1967 cable from the Brazilian Embassy in Peru mentioned that President Belaúnde 
had publicly referred to the possibility of using nuclear explosions to undertake major public works, such as building 
dams (Spektor, forthcoming; Brasemb Lima, 1967). 
 
10 While forcefully condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brazil also expressed concern with the fact 
that the Western powers “did not sufficiently denounce the very dangerous doctrine” which underpinned the 
invasion, i.e., the idea that the superpowers could legitimately intervene in countries within their respective “spheres 
of influence”. Brazil publicly rejected that notion that “a new Tordesilhas” might divide the world between the US 
and the USSR (Amado, 1982: 133-134 and 148). 
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instance.   Moreover,   to   Brazilian   eyes,   the   theory   and   practice   of   United   Nations  
peacekeeping   operations   did   not   seem   to   threaten   the   sovereign   equality   of   states   or  
their  capacity  for  autonomous  action.  
   However,   one   aspect   of   peacekeeping   operations   did   concern   Brazilian  
diplomats.   Peacekeeping  was   not   foreseen   in   the   UN   Charter   and   the   legal   basis   for  
these   operations   was   therefore   ambiguous.   This   kind   of   ambiguity   suggested   wide  
latitude   for   the   Security  Council   –   in   particular,   its   permanent  members   –   to   act   in   a  
wholly   unconstrained   fashion,   with   unpredictable   consequences   for   the  missions,   the  
UN  Charter,  and  the  Organization  as  a  whole.    
   Brazil   might   have   been   inclined   to   consider   contributing   to   peacekeeping  
operations  if  it  felt  that  doing  so  might  enhance  its  ability  to  participate  in  defining  their  
legal  basis.  Neither  the  experience  with  UNEF  I,  nor  the  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  work  of  the  United  
Nations   endorsed   this   view.  On   the   contrary,   there  was   already   a  perception   that   the  
permanent   members   of   the   Security   Council   were   engaged   in   a   conscious   effort   to  
strengthen   their   control   over   peacekeeping   missions,   to   the   detriment   of   the   elected  
members  of  the  Council,   the  General  Assembly,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,   the  Secretary-­‐‑
General  himself  (Delbrasonu,  1973a;  Delbrasonu,  1973e;  SERE,  1973b).  
   In   this   context,   it   is   not   surprising   that   when   the   Second   United   Nations  
Emergency  Force  (UNEF  II)  was  created  in  1973,  Brazil  did  not  demonstrate  interest  in  
participating.   The   Brazilian  Mission   to   the  UN   cabled  Brasília   detailed   reports   on   the  
discussions   regarding   the   composition   of   the   peacekeeping   force,   but   at   no   point  
suggested  that  Brazil  might  participate.  References  to  this  possibility  are  similarly  absent  
in   the   cables   sent   back   from   the   Ministry   of   External   Relations   (Delbrasonu,   1973c;  
Delbrasonu,  1973d).  
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   If  Brazil  did  not   consider   contributing   troops   to  peacekeeping,  how  did   it  view  
the   possibility   of   more   sustained   engagement   in   the   discussions   on   peacekeeping  
happening   in   New   York?   This   was,   after   all,   a   fervent   time   for   such   discussions  
(Urquhart,   1987:   240).   The   financing   of   peacekeeping   operations   was   a   controversial  
issue  and   the   International  Court  of   Justice’s  1962  advisory  opinion  on   the  matter  did  
little  to  quell  the  related  debates  in  New  York  (Delbrasonu,  1963e;  United  Nations,  1962:  
151-­‐‑181;  Review,  1999;  Claude,  1963).  The  creation  of  UNEF  II  put  back  on   the   table  a  
number   of   concrete   issues   regarding   the   political   and   logistic   management   of  
peacekeeping,  including  which  countries  would  contribute  troops,  a  subject  hammered  
out  by  the  states  and  not  left  to  the  Secretariat  as  today.  
   At   first,   Brazil   engaged   vigorously   in   these   deliberations,   impelled   by  
apprehensions   regarding   the   gradual   concentration   of   control   and   oversight   of  
peacekeeping   in   the   hands   of   the  permanent  members   of   the   Security  Council   (Uziel,  
2010).   This   tendency,   if   left   unchecked,   could   compromise   the   usefulness   of  
peacekeeping  as  a  tool  for  the  UN,  reducing  it  to  an  instrument  to  advance  great  power  
interests   (along   the   same   lines   of   the   arguments   made   in   Congress   against   Brazil’s  
participation  in  UNEF  I  in  1956).  Moreover,  Brazil  increasingly  felt  that  the  Council  as  a  
whole  was   slowly   being   appropriated   as   a   venue   to   consolidate   bilateral   agreements  
reached  between  Moscow  and  Washington  and   losing   its   character  as  an   independent  
political   body   (Araujo   Castro,   1972;   SERE,   1977),   which   made   the   issue   even   more  
urgent.  These   concerns  were  very  explicit   in   instructions   that   the  Ministry  of  External  
Relations   sent   the   Brazilian  Mission   to   the  UN  on   the   question   of   peacekeeping:   “the  
freezing  of  world  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few  States,  be  they  the  permanent  members  of  
the  Security  Council  or   the   two  superpowers,   is  against   the   interests  of  Brazil”   (SERE,  
1973b).  
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   In   light   of   this,   Brazil   sought   to   promote   a   series   of   initiatives,   including   a  
possible  Charter  amendment  to  deal  with  peacekeeping  (SERE,  1973a;  SERE,  1973b)  and  
the   presentation,   in   the   General   Assembly,   of   a   series   of   “principles”   to   guide   the  
functioning  of  these  operations  (Delbrasonu,  1973b).  In  the  General  Assembly’s  Special  
Committee   on   Peacekeeping  Operations   (the   C-­‐‑3311),   Brazil,   alongside   other   countries  
such  as  Argentina,  Egypt,   India,  Nigeria,   and  Pakistan,   tried   to  bridge   the  differences  
between   Member   States   and   define   clearly   the   roles   of   the   Council,   the   General  
Assembly,   and   the   Secretary   General   in   the   establishment   and   management   of  
peacekeeping  operations.  
   Brazil   hoped   that   by   reaching   a   modicum   of   agreement   on   such   issues,   the  
Assembly  would   remain   an   important   forum   for   the   discussion   of   peacekeeping   and  
keep   the   Security   Council   from   monopolizing   control   of   these   operations.   It   hoped  
thereby   to  consolidate   in   the  United  Nations  a  model   for  peacekeeping  similar   to   that  
which  had  governed  UNEF  I,  in  which  the  General  Assembly  and  the  Secretary  General  
retained  sizable  influence  of  the  operation  –  and  Brazil  was  a  member  of  the  committee  
in  charge  of  supervising  the  force.  
   These   efforts   yielded   few   results,   and   by   the  mid-­‐‑1970s,   Brazil’s   patience  with  
discussions  on  peacekeeping  was  wearing  thin.  In  smaller  forums  such  as  the  C-­‐‑33  (and  
the   Security   Council12),   Brazilian   negotiators   could   count   on   relatively   few   allies   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 From its inception in 1966 to 1988, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was known as the C-33, in 
view of its membership; when China joined in 1988, it started being called the C-34, a term still used at the UN 
jargon, although the Committee has over 100 members today. (Uziel & Vargas, 2011: 166-181). 
 
12 Brazil’s absence from the Security Council between 1968 and 1988 is a similar but distinct issue that merits 
greater attention than it has received. Although some of the reasons for this absence were analogous to those for 
Brazil’s withdrawal from peacekeeping, the two cases have a number of distinct features, perhaps chief among them 
being the importance of the issue of Portuguese colonies in Africa to Brazil’s calculations on whether to return to the 
Security Council after its 1967-1968 term. Distancing Brazil from the Council appears to have been less consensual 
position within the Ministry of External Relations than deciding not to participate in peacekeeping operations 
(Vargas, 2013: 201-203).  
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support  their  positions  and  constantly  ran  the  risk  of  being  isolated  (Delbrasonu,  1973f).  
There  was  no  imposing  voting  bloc  of  developing  countries  such  as  those  that  could  be  
marshaled   in   the   full   General   Assembly   or   in   the   Economic   and   Social   Council.  
Therefore,  participating   in   the  discussions  of   the  C-­‐‑33  was  a   frustrating  exercise,  with  
little  chance  of  securing  desirable  outcomes  while  expending  valuable  human  resources  
and  political  capital.  
   The  result  was   that,   in  1977,  Brazil   left   the  C-­‐‑33,   the   final  step   in   the  process  of  
distancing  itself  from  peacekeeping  operations  that  began  with  the  drawdown  of  UNEF  
I.  The  reasons  for  the  withdrawal  from  the  Special  Committee  were  laid  out  in  a  cable  
sent  from  the  Ministry  of  External  Relations  to  the  Brazilian  Mission  to  the  UN  in  May  
of  1977(SERE,  1977).  The  cable  observed  that  since  the  C-­‐‑33’s  first  session  in  1966,  it  had  
failed  to  make  significant  progress  towards  the  creation  of  guidance  for  peacekeeping,  
notwithstanding  considerable  efforts   in   this   regard  by  Brazil  and  other  countries.  This  
failure  was  laid  at  the  feet  of  the  US,  UK,  France  and  the  Soviet  Union  (China  was  not  a  
member  of  the  C-­‐‑33  at  that  point),  who,  “despite  their  disagreements,  in  reality  agree  on  
preserving   for   themselves   the  monopoly   on   decision-­‐‑making   regarding   peacekeeping  
operations”   and   exercised   a   “virtual   veto   power”   that   hampered   the   Committee’s  
operation.  In  light  of  these  obstacles,  the  efforts  by  Brazil  and  other  developing  countries  
to  bring  the  Committee  to  substantive  agreement  achieved  only  “modest  results”.  
   The  cable  went  on  to  state  that  this  state  of  matters  was  likely  to  persist  and  that  it  
was   therefore   necessary   to   “redefine   Brazil’s   position”.   It   cited   Brazil’s   “reduced  
interest”  in  shouldering  “the  burden  of  a  leadership  role”  in  efforts  to  exert  pressure  on  
the  superpowers  in  the  C-­‐‑33  and  noted  that  discussions  on  peacekeeping  were  unlikely  
to   influence   “other   issues   related   to   the   political   structure   of   the   United   Nations”,  
including  amendments  to  the  Charter.  This  would  be  particularly  true  given  signs  that  
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the  C-­‐‑33  might  give  up  on  elaborating  “broad  guidelines”  for  peacekeeping  and  instead  
begin  considering  “concrete  aspects  relative  to  the  implementation  of  these  operations”,  
as  desired  by  some  troop-­‐‑contributing  countries.  
   Taking   into   account   all   of   these   factors,   as   well   as   Brazil’s   “reduced   practical  
interest”   in   peacekeeping   as   a   whole,   the   cable   announced   the   decision   to   leave   the  
Committee.   Shortly   after   receiving   the   cabled   instructions,   Brazil’s   delegation   in  New  
York   formalized   the   country’s   withdrawal   from   the   C-­‐‑33,   the   final   step   in   Brazil’s  
disengagement  from  UN  peacekeeping  (United  Nations,  1977).  
  
Other  factors:  the  military  regime  and  peacekeeping:  
     
The  main  reason  for   the  1967-­‐‑1989  gap  in  Brazil’s  participation   in  UN  peacekeeping   is  
therefore  that  these  operations  simply  did  not  fall  within  the  priorities  and  worldview  
that  drove   the  country’s  multilateral  activism  in   that  period.  That   is  not,  however,   the  
only  reason.  Foreign  policy  decisions  rarely  derive  from  a  single  cause,  and  in  this  case,  
the  particular  characteristics  of  the  military  regime  in  Brazil  probably  also  contributed  to  
country’s  decision  to  distance  itself  from  UN  peacekeeping.  
   As  mentioned   above,   nothing  prevents   a  military   or   authoritarian   regime   from  
contributing   to   peacekeeping   operations   and   many   indeed   have   done   and   do   so.   In  
Brazil’s   case,   however,   the  military   character   of   the   regime  may  well   have  dampened  
the  enthusiasm  for  making  such  a  contribution.  
   The   dictatorship   that   was   put   into   place   by   the   coup   d’état   in   1964   was   an  
“institutional”  one,  in  the  sense  that  power  was  concentrated  not  in  the  hands  of  a  single  
individual   –   a   Franco   or   a   Salazar-­‐‑type   figure   –   but   in   those   of   the   Armed   Forces,  
especially   the   Army.   To   a   greater   or   lesser   degree,   the   five   Generals   who   held   the  
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Brazilian  Presidency  in  succession  all  had  to  contend  with  the   interests,   influence,  and  
vanities  of  their  colleagues  in  uniform.  The  views  of  the  military  brass  therefore  carried  
weight  in  all  areas  of  government  –  including  foreign  policy.  
   In  1967  and  1968,  the  military  regime  also  accentuated  its  authoritarian  character,  
with  the  coming  to  power  of  General  Costa  e  Silva  and  the  imposition  of  “Institutional  
Act  n.  5”  (AI-­‐‑5),  the  brutal  decree  that  suspended  whatever  was  left  of  civil  liberties  and  
helped  spread  an  epidemic  of  torture  in  Brazilian  military  and  police  installations.  More  
than  ever  before,  Brazil’s  military  focused  its  attention  and  resources  on  combating  so-­‐‑
called   “terrorists”   and   “subversive   elements”,   such   as   the   members   of   the   guerrilla  
movement  in  the  area  of  the  Araguaia  River.  In  this  context  of  “war  at  home”,  it  is  very  
much  open  to  question  whether  Army  chiefs  would  have  looked  favorably  on  proposals  
by   the   Ministry   of   External   Relations   to   send   troops   abroad   to   participate   in  
peacekeeping  exercises  (Napolitano,  2014;  Martins,  1986).  
   The   progressively   worsening   human   rights   situation   in   Brazil   and   the  
accompanying   outcry   abroad  would   also   have  dampened   any   enthusiasm   for   putting  
Brazilian  troops  in  the  limelight  of  international  peacekeeping.  Brazil’s  attitude  towards  
human   rights   issues   in   general   and   the   country’s   own   record   in   particular   was  
profoundly  defensive.13  Sending  Brazilian  troops  to  help  “maintain  peace”  abroad  might  
have   drawn  unwelcome   attention   to   the   very   different   role   they  were   playing  within  
their  own  country’s  borders.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In his memoirs, former Minister of External Relations Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro might have alluded in a sibylline 
manner to this concern, when commenting why Brazil did not run for a seat on the Security Council, stating that 
there, “even more than in the Assembly, because in a small group every vote counts for a lot we would be subject to 
pressures and/or efforts by other countries to use us for their own ends, without any benefit to us” (Saraiva Guerreiro, 
1992: 45). For one account of international scrutiny of human rights violations in Brazil and the discomfort it caused 
in Brazilian authorities, see Green (2010). 
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   Additionally,  military  perceptions  were   influenced  by  the  chaotic  circumstances  
involving  UNEF  I  withdrawal.  Caught  in  the  crossfire  of  the  Six  Day  War  between  Arab  
and  Israeli   forces,  with  Brazilian  casualties,  a  generation  of  military  officers   learned  to  
distrust   the  UN   and   its   efforts   to  maintain   peace.   The   political   and   logistic   confusion  
that  accompanied  the  operation’s  withdrawal  probably  left  many  Brazilian  officers  leery  
of  donning  blue  helmets  again  in  the  future  (Arraes,  2009:  219-­‐‑242).  
  
The  resumption  of  Brazil'ʹs  participation  in  peacekeeping:  
     
Brazil'ʹs   return   to  democracy  hit   its  stride  between  1985  and  1990,  when  a  civilian  was  
elected   president   (1985),   a   new   constitution  was   adopted   (1988),   a   direct   presidential  
election  was   held   (1989)   and   a   new  president  was   inaugurated   (1990)   –   the   first   time  
since  1961  that  a  civilian  transmitted  the  office  to  another  civilian.  President  José  Sarney  
(1985-­‐‑1990)  predicated  his   foreign  policy  on  using   the   return   to  democratic   rule   to   re-­‐‑
construct  Brazil’s  international  reputation,  seeking  to  erase  the  image  of  a  “rejectionist”  
or  “defensive”  power,  particularly  regarding  so-­‐‑called  new  issues  such  as  environment  
and   human   rights.   The   country   signed   and   ratified   major   treaties   in   both   areas   and  
expanded   its   substantive   engagement   in   international   fora.   In   1987,   the   Minister   of  
External  Relations  announced  that  Brazil  would  run  for  a  seat  on  the  Security  Council  in  
the  1988-­‐‑1989  term.  Its  successful  election  ended  an  almost  twenty  year  absence  from  the  
Council  (Fonseca,  2001;  Seixas  Corrêa,  2012;  Côrtes,  2010).  
   This   approach  was   largely  maintained   by   Sarney’s   three   immediate   successors  
(Fernando   Collor   de   Mello,   1990-­‐‑1992;   Itamar   Franco,   1992-­‐‑1994;   Fernando   Henrique  
Cardoso,  1995-­‐‑2002).  It  both  reflected  and  accelerated  an  erosion  of  the  worldview  that  
had  guided  Brazilian  diplomacy   in   the  previous  decades.   The  debt   crisis   of   the   1980s  
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displayed   the   limits  of   trying   to  overcome   international   economic   constraints   through  
multilateral  political  action  (Bueno,  1994:  94).  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  seemed  to  herald  
a  new  fluidity  in  international  politics,  where  the  idea  of  “freezing  of  world  power”  lost  
much  of  its  interpretive  power.  In  short,  the  ascendancy  of  liberal  democratic  forces  both  
within  Brazil  and   in   the   international  system  more  broadly   led  Brazilian  diplomacy  to  
make   a   significant   strategic   adjustment.   Before,   selective,   defensive   multilateral  
engagement   was   seen   as   a   way   to   resist   the   consolidation   of   an   international   order  
inimical   to   the   interests   of   developing   countries.   Now,   in   a   context   of   less   rigidity,  
multilateral   engagement   was   a   chance   to   strengthen   the   country’s   credentials   and   to  
help   shape   the   many   new   international   regimes   that   were   coming   into   being   or  
renewing  themselves  (Ferreira,  2006:  119-­‐‑136).  
   One   of   the   international   transformations   triggered   by   the   thawing   of   the   Cold  
War   was   the   rapid   expansion   of   peacekeeping   operations.   Under   the   watchful   but  
enthusiastic  eyes  of  the  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council,  a  number  of  new  
operations  were  created,  their  ranks  filled  by  troops  both  from  traditional  contributors  
and   from   the   Warsaw   Pact   countries.   This   blooming   of   peacekeeping   was   seen   as  
evidence   of   the  United  Nations’   recovery   of   a   central   place   in   the   international   arena  
(Kertcher,  2012;  Fontoura,  2005).  
   In   contrast  with   the   1970s,   when   the   peacekeeping   scenario   seemed   bleak   and  
dominated   by   a   few   manipulative   great   powers,   acting   under   the   UN   flag   now  
presented   itself   as   an   opportunity   for   Brazil   to   take   part   in  meritorious   international  
action   to   reestablish   itself   as  a   relevant  player.  The   initial   resumption  of   contributions  
was  timid  and  framed  as  an  attempt  to  contribute  to  solving  conflicts  in  areas  of  direct  
interest,   such   as   Angola   and   Central   America   –   a   framework   preferred   by   many  
developing  countries  by  that  time.  Brazil  resumed  its  contribution  in  1989,  deploying  8  
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military  observers  to  the  first  United  Nations  Angola  Verification  Mission  (UNAVEM  I),  
to  which   it   also   contributed   the  Commander   of   the  Military  Observer   Corps.   Brazil’s  
reintegration   into   peacekeeping   activities   was   slow,   as   both   diplomats   and   military  
officers  had  to  relearn  the  long-­‐‑forgotten  lessons  of  UNEF  I  and  reacquire  confidence  in  
international  organizations,  while  at  the  same  time  following  the  rapid  evolution  in  the  
practices  and  challenges  of  UN  peacekeeping  (Brazil,  1989;  Kertcher,  2012;  Uziel,  2010).  
   In  the  following  years,  Brazil  would  deploy  military  observers  and  staff  officers  
in   another  mission   in  Angola   (UNAVEM   II);   to  ONUCA,   in   Central  America;   and   to  
ONUSAL,   in   El   Salvador.   In   1993,   Brazil   deployed   its   first   formed   contingent   to   a  
peacekeeping   mission   since   Suez,   to   the   United   Nations   Operation   in   Mozambique  
(ONUMOZ).  By  that  time,  peacekeeping  operations  would  be  fully  incorporated  into  the  
practice  and  preferences  of  great  powers  and  were  treated  almost  as  a  panacea  for  the  
numerous   conflicts   erupting   around   the   globe.   Accordingly,   by   1992,   Brazil   had  
reincorporated  into  its  diplomatic  rhetoric  the  notion  of  being  a  frequent  and  traditional  
contributor   to  peacekeeping  missions,  highlighting   this  as  evidence  of   its  commitment  
to  United  Nations  collective  security  (Fontoura,  2009;  Seixas  Corrêa,  2012:  665-­‐‑677).  
  
Conclusion  
     
There  is  nothing  particularly  remarkable  about  a  country  not  contributing  troops  to  UN  
peacekeeping   at   any   given   period.   Especially   during   the  Cold  War,  when   there  were  
fewer   and   smaller   operations,   many   States   did   not   participate   in   peacekeeping   for   a  
number   of   reasons   –   including   the   fact   that   they  were   never   asked   to   do   so.   Brazil’s  
1967-­‐‑1989   absence   from  peacekeeping   is   noteworthy   for   three   reasons:   because   it   had  
contributed   before;   because   this   absence   coincided   with   a   period   of   heightened  
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multilateral  activism  on  the  part  of  Brazilian  diplomacy;  and  because  of  how  quickly  the  
country   made   “troop   contributing   country”   an   important   part   of   its   international  
identity  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  
   Not  participating  in  peacekeeping  is  by  and  large  a  “non-­‐‑policy”,  particularly  in  a  
period   of   fewer   such   operations.   Brazil   did   not   have   to   actively   negotiate   to   keep   its  
troops  out  of  such  missions:  essentially,  it  just  had  to  sit  back  and  not  volunteer.  There  is  
therefore  much  less  concrete  evidence  and  explanation  for  this  policy  than  there  is,  for  
instance,   for  Brazil’s   active   opposition   to   the  Non-­‐‑Proliferation  Treaty,  which  was   the  
subject  of  numerous  speeches,  cables,  and  memoranda.  
   Nevertheless,   there   is   sufficient   evidence   to   suggest   that   Brazil’s   absence   from  
peacekeeping   did   not   simply   result   from   the   1964   coup   d’état,   the   deepening   of  
repression  in  1968,  or  from  an  oversight  or  a  casual  lack  of  interest.  On  the  contrary,  this  
absence  arose  from  a  pressing  and  conscious  concern  regarding  Brazil’s  place  in  world  
affairs  and  the  role  of  the  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  –  especially  the  
two  superpowers  –  in  the  control  of  these  operations.  From  1967  to  1977,  Brazil  actively  
participated   in   the   diplomatic   struggle   to   determine   the   “institutional   ownership”   of  
peacekeeping   operations   –   that   is,   the   respective   roles   and   responsibilities   of   the  
Security  Council,   the  General  Assembly,   the  Secretary  General,   and  member   states,   in  
particular  those  contributing  troops.  From  Brazil’s  point  of  view,  a  fairer  distribution  of  
these   responsibilities   would   mean   that   peacekeepers   would   be   less   prone   to  
manipulation  by  the  great  powers  –  a  sign  of  better  balance  between  great  and  middle  
and   small  powers   in   the  UN.  Under   such   circumstances,   contribution  of   troops   could  
have  become  more  attractive.  
   It   was   not   to   be,   however.   By   1977,   having   lost   hope   of   curbing   the   growing  
influence   of   the   permanent   members   of   the   Security   Council   over   peacekeeping  
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operations,   Brazil   left   the   Special  Committee   (C-­‐‑33)   and   ceased   its   active   engagement  
with  the  issue  for  almost  a  decade.  Blue-­‐‑helmeted  Brazilians  would  only  be  seen  again  
in   1988,   by   which   time   the   country,   the   international   system,   and   the   face   of  
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